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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
BY GUILLERMO E. PERRY I | HERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT A CURRENCY-BOARD REGIME CAN HELP ACHIEVE DRAMATic reductions in inflation rates. The transparency of the fixed exchange rate as a nominal anchor and the loss of monetary policy flexibility enhance the anti-inflation credibility of policy-makers. Currency boards also impose fiscal discipline because expenditures cannot be financed by printing money However, it is also clear that in ie event of negative external shocks, the loss in flexibility that a currency-board regime entails iay pose threats to the stability of the financial sector and can be very costly in terms of forDne output and employment.
We did not intend the roundtable to concentrate exclusively on the issue of why or when Duntries may or may not benefit from establishing a currency board, because these had been ie topics of a previous conference at the World Bank.' So, issues related to the installation of ich a system (e.g., the initial level of reserves, the proper parity) or transitional issues (e.g., the seed of inflation convergence) were not the focus of the discussion. Instead, the discussion covred issues related to the impact of external shocks on economies already operating under this ind of regime. In particular, we were interested in understanding how to mitigate the potenally dire consequences of external shocks.
As is well known, external shocks may negatively affect the needed to maintain an equilibrium real exchange rate when capancial stability of an economy, because, as discussed by John ital flows out or the terms of trade deteriorate. Under these conilliamson, pure currency-board regimes do not offer a lender ditions the burden of adjustment consequently falls on the level last resort, which is a traditional role of central banks. On the of output and employment. The issue then is what we can do to il side of the economy the "stickiness" of wages and prices mitigate these effects. eclude downward nominal adjustments. which would be Reducing the probability of being hit by severe external .t 1 ' ' \ 1 ' 1: 1. N C^ ' I "I (] K( 11 A!\ S I *Vl,3\ \ 15t \ \1 1 ( 1 1 6 \ shocks may he a long-term endeavor. The vulnerabilitv to trade cannot eliminate systemic risks, and ultimately, if the sw shocks in the long run can be reduced through trade and proarrangements and international piivate credit lines are r ductive diversification. WiLh respect to shocks affecting the capenough, either the Argentine Central Bank or the fiscal autho ital account, as long as capital flows respond to endogenous facties will need to provide funds to prevent potential collapses tors, a disciplined and credible macroeconomic stance seems to the payments system. In fact, the experience of Estonia I be crucial -although as Stan Fischer recalled in his comments, taught us that even while some banks are closed in the midst the experience of the European countries in 1992 shows that the a systemic crisis, government lencling can minimize the losse degree of macroeconomic discipline required to maintain fixed CJenerally, there seems to be a trade-off between the use parities is, in fact, very demanding. Moreover, even with a strong reserves to support convertibility or to support the bankinig s' macro stance, consolidating credibility may take time, especially tem. In practice there may be a need for public institutions when weak credibility was the reason to institute a currency play some limited role of lender of last resort in order to mai board in the first place. Unfortunately, as Max Corden reminded tain the convertibility of the currency, as long as deposits us, capital flows also respond to exogenous factors, which are allowed to be withdl-awn in cash. CGtillermo Calvo argued th not related to domestic economic or political events. So, what in flact, in the Argentine case, where a large share of deposits c else can be done besides maintaining fiscal discipline?
in dollars, a devaluation coulcl have made the financial cri lIet us look first at the issue of the vulnerability of the evenx worse 4 financial sector and potential alternatives to a domestic lender of It may be true, however, that in the long run banks w last resort. The historical experience with currency-board type no access to a lender of last resort may become very conser' regimes -such as that of Hong Kong prior to 1972 and more tive, because the moral hazard is eliminated. As Stan Fiscl recently since 1983, which has been successful, according to Sir pointed out in his presenlation, the existence of a curren Alan Walters, and that of the L S. states before the Federal board may produce healthy pressures. As international expe Reserve -have shown that modifications in the regulatorv ences have demonstrated, in the short run it may be wise struclure can reduce the need for a lender of last resort. Hong acctimulate excess international reserves, strengthen super Kong, for example, has a highly concentrated banking system sion, establish high reserve or liquidity requirements -as t with a highly diversified international porLfolio, which has perArgentines have done -and to have either the government mitted the Exchange Fund to make limited use of reserves to an independent specialized agencx to act as a limited lender support very small banks during times of distr-ess. Several .S. last resort. states during the era of free banking permitted banks to branch Regarding the impact of external shocks on1 employmi out within states, which reduced the number of smalL banks and and economic activity besides their impact on the financial s' also encouraged diversification. In general, regulations that pCetem, Max Corden emphasized that reforming the labor marl mit greater concentration of the banking sector and portfolio should be the first item on the agenda. The remaining questi diversification tend to reduce (but not eliminate) the need for a is hoxx much and how last it wiLI contribute to achieving doxx public lender of last resort.-ward nominal wage and nontradable price fLexibility Sir Al Turning to the case of Argentina, we see thal permitting
Walters emphasized that Hong Kong has a very flexible lalthe internationalization of the financial sector can help both to market. (It would be interesting to know how much the currc reduce the vulnerabilitv of banks to negative external shocks and cy-board regime has contributed to this development.) Cord to smooth out capital flows, because foreign-owned subsidiaries also reminded us that to the extent that employment can can drawx from credit lines to their parent banks when confrontaffected by counter-cyclical fiscal policies, a country that F ed with negative external shocks. Although for good reasons, gained credibility and a high level of reserves could eventua such as better client knowledge, countries like Argentina are attempl to use fiscal policies to counter negative shocks. likely to maintain a sizable domestic banking system, they also These were some of the issues covered during the roun may obtain such "cushion effect" fronm swap arrangements, such have currency boards, and I can't stop myself from saying something on the subject. But the main task here is to consider a country that has decided to establish some system of that kind-whether it is Argentina, Hong Kong, or Estonia. What should it do to deal with the inevitable dilemmas? I will give you my views on that topic straight away withut filling in the details, so that there will be something for the other panelists to say Then I 'ould like to say a few words about the broader issue: What are the criteria for deciding whether country should have a currency board or not?
So, assume that the decision has been made, there is a pretty firm political commitment, and ie country is stuck with all these problems, like those confronting Argentina today I will just iake three simple points:
First, labor market flexibility is crucial. This is easier said tions to that little problem. an done. That is the big problem, and I am sure that it is a Second, it one could avoid shocks, it wvould be great, alor problem for Argentina, as for any substantial economy I because then there would be no problem Shocks that cannot be tve no elementary propositions to make about how to bring avoided are those Lhat originate from, sayr variations in U.S 'out labor market flexibility; lhat is the art of politics. And how monetary policies or from changes in the terms of trade. But a )es one persuade politicians and, above all, trade unionists, country can avoid capital inflow-outflow shocks, to some extent, at it is necessary, that in the long run workers are going to be bv manking the currency-board system credible. So if there is st as well off -or better off -with nomnial wage flexibility going to be a currency board, it is necessary to convince the marwxvnvard than by hanging on to nominal wvage levels xvhile ket that the government really means it, that it is going to stick )mmal demand declines when there is, for example, a capital with it and with the associated necessary policies -above all, My first ciriterion is: Don't bother introducing a system Li similar to a currency board, but nevertheless hacL fiscal and forthis unless the country has had some inflation problem. If the eign-debt prohlems. If credibilitv can he achieved, thcre will he is a country where a currency-board system appears to he su xewer shocks that come from sudden capital outflows. That is able hut wlhere there has ncver really been a major inflati easier said than done, but credibility is the second requuirement, problem, I would say, "Let sleeping dogs lie." There are oth and I think that Argentina is trying on that front. Hiong Kong ways of keeping inflation down in the future. So, we are nL maybe has achieved a high degree of cr-edibility, but the thing has rowing Lhe problem down to those countries that have expe to be rcalLv credible.
ececl a significant inflation problem. Third, some fiscal fLexibility can he helpful. In the situa-'she second and most imporLant consideration -comi tion where there is, say, an adverse terms-of trade shock or a froin the theory of optimum currency' areas is that there ii capital-outflow Problemx, it helps to he able to engage in some serious case for small and very open economies to have a cc temporary fiscal expansion, which could involve more foreign rency board system of some kind. The degree of openness -t debt. This would offset, at Least to some extent, the domestic ratio of tradables to nontradables -is crucial. The argument deflationary effects resulting otherwise from Lhe currency-board favor of adopting a currency board is weaker -and possil'
system. Of course. this means that big eiscal scirpluses niust be ther-e is no case -for large economies (with a loxy ratio of tra run during the previous boom. In other words, one cannot just abLes). This raises the practical question (which I don't have t say that the obvious solution is to run a big budget cleficit to lime to get into) oft where to draw Lhe line. [hey' might as well have completely fix to avoid infLation; you tic your currency to a low-inflation curexchange rate regimes. And, if there is going lo be an attempt rency, make a firm commitment, anId you will keep inflation a fixed exchange rate, they are much better oflf with a curren down. Countries that have a great deal of other problems but board than with a fixed but potentially adjustable exchange rm have maintained a fixed parity, such as francophone African regime, because of the speculation problem. So I think there i: countries in the past, have achieved low inflation. So, it certainlot to be said in favor of a currency board relative to a fixed-bi ly works: and there are other examples. If you really stick with adjustable exchange-rate regime. By' "fixed-but-adjustable" it, you are going lo get low inflation. BuL one must remember inean a rate that is fairly firmly fixed, with an attempt by t that there can still be reasons f'or capital inflows. Hence. prices authorities to hang onto the fixed rate, but never eliminating t will rise when the nmoney suppLy rises as capital flows in, or possibility of excl'iange-rate realignment. xwhen the terms of trade improve. For example, though Hong So, where does one draw the line? Looking at the expe Kong's currency board has prevented contrntnius high inflation.
ence of these countries, I was surprised to find that in Co Wecst Africa fan important example), and Hong Kong wvill be disrocct. these txo werc the onlv ones nith negative grottth ratcs eussed bh Alan Walters. Finally, I twant to mention another count the end of the period we studied shotws that it is possible to introduce some kind of rule or insti-A third consideration is ones attitudc to%tard risk and enrtution that prevents the monetization ot fiscal deficits tithout is. Any finance minister (I name no names) weho commits himgoing as flar as a currency-board system, and, indeed, tithout elf or herself to this kind of regime is runninig a risk. If it is suCmaking a long-term lixed exchange rate commitment. I am not essful, it is fantastic. If it is not successful, there is a disaster.
saying that this type of arrangement carries the same credibility uppose someone says vou should cross the Girand Canyon on a as a currency board, nor that it is ideal ancL till solvte every probope, and if you get across. you will get a Nohel Prize and an 1cm. But then one has to ask howv much eredibility a currencyxtra million dollars, and \ou have a 50-50 chance of making it.
hoard system carries, and here I think the experience of Hong s it a good decision in that case to cross the Grand Canyon? I Kong is relevant. hink the same issuc arises for finance ministers tvhen they com-
III. FEATURES AND IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENCY BOARDS: THOUGHTS ABOUT THE ARGENTINE SITUATION BY JOHN WILLIAMSON
I T SEEMS TO ME THAT CURRENCY BOARDS HAVE THREE FEATURES THAT CAN CONSTRAIN an economy's ability to react to external shocks. In the first place, a currency board implies a fixed exchange rate. That can be modified a little, as the IMF showed several years ago, but only to a predetermined crawl, which still does not give any major freedom to react to external shocks. The second feature is that it requires the monetary base to be contracted by 100 percent of a reserve outflow; there is no facility to sterilize the reserve outflow in order to preserve internal balance or the level of domestic economic activity The third feature is that it precludes any lender-of-last-resort facilities in the event of a bank run.
The fixed exchange rate, of course, precludes the use of the exchange-rate instrument to help adjust the balance of payments when faced with some negative external shock that requires a payments improvement. The 100 percent marginal reserve requirement prevents any attempt to use sterilization to ameliorate the impact of a reserve loss. The lack of a lender-of-last-resort facility makes the banks more vulnerable to a confidence crisis.
The consequence of the first two features is to ensure that a crisis impossible, one would need 100 percent backing of M2, any reserve loss is translated into a deflationary impact on the which is much stronger than a currency-board system. domestic economy One of the counter-advantages is that that I think that the first two of those constraints are clearly reaction is guaranteed, which serves to mitigate the danger that less important in a small economy than in a large one. The traa loss of confidence will turn into a speculative run. So it is ditional optimal currency area analysis tells us that the exchange important to recognize that there is a significant offset there. But rate is a less effective instrument for facilitating balance of payit is also important to recognize that it is a misconception to ments adjustment in a small economy For this reason adjustthink that that danger is eliminated by a 100 percent reserve ments in a small economy have to come by deflation, and then requirement against MO, because M2 can be converted into MO you may as well have the 100 percent marginal reserve requirefreely If it can't, then that constitutes a bank crisis. So, to make ment. Essentially, you have to take that medicine, and so there
is no great advantage in being able to avoid it in the short run, in Argentina. By 1994, the current account deficit was 3.5 per which is all that you get by sterilization. So I agree with what cent of GDP and increasing, and it did not look as though it wa. Max Corden just said about currency boards' being rather good going to stop increasing as long as the boom persisted. The com instruments in small economies but being more dubious with bination of a fixed exchange rate, a current account deficit, sub respect to large economies. stantial short-term international debt, and a weak banking sys As regards the third constraint imposed by a currency tem made Argentina the principal victim of the tequila effect. I board -the elimination of the lender of last resort -we also experienced capital flight; the banking system looked very vul used to think that that was another reason for thinking that curnerable; the government naturally dithered between tightenin 1 rency boards were rather benign for small economies, because enough to restore confidence in the currency, on the one hand small economies were likely to have a strong presence of foreign and trying to give some type of support to the banking systen banks, and the foreign banks would tend to put in money to by cutting reserve requirements and so on, on the other hand support the system in a crisis. But, of course, the foreign banks Argentina did avoid a complete collapse of confidence but, o suddenly stopped doing that in Argentina last year. So that does course, it ended up with a very sharp recession, and unemploy not look as convincing as it did. Perhaps other speakers will ment rose from the traditional low levels to something like 1I address the question whether a change in policy could give percent. It seems to me that Argentina is unable to afford a brisl countries more protection against being cut off by the foreign recovery because it has to accept a period of the classical medi banks than Argentina found it had last year.
cine of falling prices if it is to strengthen competitiveness anc For those reasons I concluded in a study I did last year 0 overcome the problem of the currency overvaluation with a fixec that currency boards might make sense for small, highly open exchange rate. Of course, Max is right in saying that, to the economies, but that they were a doubtful proposition for relaextent that the current effort to make labor markets more flexi tively large economies. I also noted that there might be excepble can indeed succeed and can permit faster disinflation, tha tional circumstances that could justify the adoption of a currenwill help. cy board in a relatively large economy Here I instanced Sebastian Edwards has talked about this as being the "exi Argentina: The total loss of credibility it was suffering in 1991 problem." 7 Having used a fixed exchange rate to good effect asseemed to me to provide a justification for what it did at that nominal anchor in bringing inflation down, how does a countn time. On the other hand, Argentina (by my book, at least) is a get out of the commitment to the fixed exchange rate in order t( relatively large economy I wondered whether the traditional restoreitscompetitivenessandmake gooduseofitsnewlyfounc textbook concept of a small, open economy had not somewhat stability? Personally, I am not sure this is a very general problem misled us here. We tend to think of a small economy as one but it certainly seems to be present in Argentina, where (I guess whose actions have no impact on the world economy, and by this is still true) the whole stabilization could be unhinged if th that token Argentina is a small economy But I think that really country took any action that was construed as abandoning tht is not the right concept here. The right concept is how much commitments made in the Convertibility Plan. Certainly an) scope an economy has for autonomy and how much scope there sudden devaluation, even if you could engineer it by having the could be once confidence was re-established. Maybe the Congress approve the necessary legislation with a super-majori exchange rate was useless in Argentina in the circumstances of ty over the weekend while the markets were closed, would risl the early 1990s, but maybe once confidence has been fully rereawakening all the latent distrust of government that had mad( established, there will be much more potential benefit there. In Argentina almost ungovernable. And so I do not see a good alter any event, the Convertibility Law adopted by Argentina in 1991, native to soldiering on. which included a currency board, was a spectacular success. It If and when this patience is rewarded by a return of con completely eliminated inflation. Argentina had four years of fidence, it is at that point that one wants to try to make the sys rapid growth, which accumulated to a 35 percent recovery of tem more flexible. The first step should be to follow the exam GDP That was impressive, and I doubt that it could have been ple of first Singapore and more recently Hong Kong in not mon achieved by simply fixing the fiscal situation, without those etizing 100 percent of the reserve inflow, which means movinf other measures of which the currency board was a major part.
away from the strict concept of a currency board and beginnin 1 Nevertheless, we have to face the fact that Argentina's curto build up foreign exchange reserves over and above those con rent situation is problematic -and for exactly the reason that it stitutionally needed, so that one will then have some scope foi suffered an acute external shock last year. It is normal for an acting as a lender of last resort in any future crisis. That also ha5 exchange-rate based stabilization to eliminate inflation only after the effect of enhancing the market's perception of the country' the currency has become overvalued; and I think that happened strength, so that it may subsequently become possible to modi-
exchange-rate policy to move to a more flexible policy (my me that a measure of recession is a price that has to be paid to eference would be a crawling band, such as Colombia had exorcise the ghost of Argentina's past mismanagement. The hen Guillermo Perry was finance minister, and still has) But I important thing is to try to make sure that this price is paid only ink one would only want to move to that type of system when once. arket perceptions were that the currency was mo re likely to I am sure that there will be some people who will tell me rengthen than to weaken, One would do it after a long conthis is too pessimistic, because Argentina is already coming out essional debate and avoid any impression of perpetrating some of recession. I think the point is that if it is not going to find itself ,w trick on the public, because it is that sort of perception that vulnerable to another crisis in two or three years' time, whenevis been so fatal to the credibility of the Argentine government er the next foreign or domestic problem arises, it needs to have the past, and not the idea per se that one could have a more that extra element of flexibility built in, and it needs to get rid of :xible policy regime.
that overvaluation that was there two years ago. If one allows any Such a reform would seem to me to place Argentina in a recovery that begins to develop to run at full throttle, one will ,tter position to confront fuLture shocks efficiently, and that is not have enough flexibility to face the next shock. My advice is hat I would like to see the authorities thinking about, rather to use any incipient recovery to build up the strength in order to an some sudden exit from the current dilemma, which would be able to have a more flexible system with xvhich to confront ,k throwing away everything achieved since 1991. It seems to future shocks. 8 Money market operations are automatically directed toward the maintenance of the $7.80 )arity If, due to some shock or other, the market exchange rate appreciates to, say, 7.7, then nterest rates in Hong Kong dollars would be reduced, and net inflows into the Hong Kong dolar would recede. A fall in the demand for Hong Kong dollars would lead to a depreciation, but rnoney-market operations will arouse Hong Kong interest rates and restore the value of the cur--ency to its par value of 7.8.
Although accounts of most currency-board regimes repreon the contrary, it sits on a pile of cash -the HKMA has issued ;ent them as purely passive -exchanging currency notes on bills so that it can influence rates through open market operalemand -the actual operation of the boards are much more tions. To complete its instruments, the HKMA introduced a disaositive. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) can assist count window in June 1992, called a Liquidity Adjustment he overriding need to maintain the external value of the curFacility This gives the Authority more control over short-term -ency through the so-called "accounting arrangements.' These inter-bank interest rates as well as some influence over the )ermit the Exchange Fund to bring pressure to bear on internature of the paper offered. Finally the HKMA has been given Dank liquidity And although Hong Kong has no indebtednesspower to lev-y deposit charges. The fix resulted in the supply of money being largely determine( real estate exposure to 40 percent of the portfolio. The Authority by the demand. Interest rates were very closely related to thos has as one of its objectives the "safety and stability of the bankin the United States. The HKMA allowed the three issuing bank ing system through the regulation of banking business ... and the to supply whatever notes were demanded. supervision of authorized institutions." But unlike central banks A common misperception is that with a fixed exchang, it has no discretion in its objectives. Its single objective is to rate the rate of inflation in Hong Kong should be very near ti maintain the parity that of the United States. Clearly, this has not occurred in th, 1983-1995 period -more than 12 years. The fixed exchang H ISTORY rate gives approximately the same rate of inflation only in trad Since its earliest days as a colony with the exception of the periable goods, which provides the price anchor. The overall mia od of Japanese occupation, Hong Kong has maintained a curtion rate is an average of tradables and nontradables. With thi rency-board arrangement. Up to 1973 the Hong Kong dollar was rate of inflation of tradables fixed, the inflation rate of nontrad fixed to sterling, so virtually all reserves were in sterling. From ables will be determined by the relative productivity growth o 1949 to 1967 sterling was fixed to the U.S. dollar through the nontradable goods and services vis-A-vis tradables. BretLon Woods agreements -although there was little free conOne may readily conclude that the productivity growth in vertibility of sterling into dollars until 1958, due to the infamous tradables has been high relative to that in nontradable sector "sterling balances" overhang. In 1967 Hong Kong adjusted with Manufacturing and more recently financial and other service the sterling depreciation and incurred a substantial capital loss have made great strides in improving productivity, whereas maio on its reserves. The Basel agreement of 1968 gave various service, haircuts and housing have not found many avenues o exchange-rate guarantees to holders of sterling, and Hong Kong productivity growth. Thus, while tradables have increased i participated. In 1971, however, the dollar went off gold, and all price only by 1-3 percent per annum, the general consume the major exchange rates were soon floating.
price index has been near 8 percent. Hong Kong also floated. The (then) two note-issuing This high rate of domestic inflation could be brough banks continued to provide Hong Kong dollars in exchange for down to 3 percent, in line with inflation of tradables, with a cur foreign currency, but at varying parities. Hong Kong participatrency-board type of arrangement if the parity were increase( ed fully in the great inflation of the 1970s. (I must confess that I every day by (1/365)x5 percent (on the assumption that the rel do not understand why inflation did not increase far more than ative productivity growth continues as in the past 12 years). It i it did; in that sense the floating period remains something of a a crawling link, no less, but one can well see objections to sucl mystery that would repay further research.) a suggestion. Nor would a fix to a basket of currencies be mucd The floating period was a misery of high inflation and low better than the fix to the dollar, since the vast majority of Hone growth, but even more important were the enormous swings in Kongs trade is with the wider dollar area of the Pacific. both prices and production. High volatility was the hallmark of the floating period 1974-1983. For example, the Hang Seng through arbitrage they had to be approximately the same as ii Under the fixed regime, from 1984 to 1994 the United States. Hong Kong suffered a boom in asset price * average real GDP growth was 6.4 percent, and Hong and particularly in house prices. It is not difficult to conclud, Kong overtook the UK in per capita income; that, had the HKMA been able to raise nominal interest rate * the trade surplus was 7.7 percent of GDP; above those dictated by the link, the asset price inflation coul * the budget surplus averaged 2.1 percent of GDP; have been largely avoided. * inflation was 7.7 percent between 1982 and 1994, Perhaps so. But the evidence is not convincing. Counter compared with 12.6 percent between 1979 and 1983. examples abound. The most striking is Japan. Certainly the yen dollar exchange rate was not fixed, yet of all OECD countrie
)an suffered perhaps the most paralyzing asset inflation from Hong Kong. It appears that the flexible exchange rate did not t87 to 1989, followed by deflation. The United Kingdom, contribute noticeably toward stabilizing the economy istralia, and the Scandinavian countries, together with even As liberalization of the PRC has proceeded, Hong Kong ible Switzerland, have all endured considerable, even traumathas made tremendous structural adjustments as it has developed asset price inflation. All of these currencies xvere floatingcloser links with South China. The low wage costs of the PRC, me more dirty than others but nevertheless not constrained by combined with the know-how that has come from Hong Kong, y institutional fix. Certainly it is difficult to attribute the by no has seen manufacturing largely disappear from Hong Kong and ?ans unusual asset inflation of Hong Kong to the currencymigrate to the PRC. More than 70 percent of Hong Kong's GDP ,ard link. It is true that Singapore, with its appreciation against now derives from services. Truly it has become the service cene dollar, did have a somewhat smoother ride than Hong Kong, ter of South China and even for the whole PRC. Most of this .t this would be a weak reed to lean upon. adjustment has occurred in a stable environment under the aegis In the case of Hong Kong one would clearly claim that the of the currency board during the last 13 years. ast disruptive shocks have been (and perhaps will be) politiOne might be forgiven for claiming that the currency 1. For example, there were the September 1983 threats of the board turned out well because China reformed and provided the oples Republic of China (PRC) to invade and "restore order"
impetus to growth that smoothed out the adjustments. Other response to the panics and run that precipitated the outflow countries that do not have a reforming China with its enormous capital in mid-1983. The political crisis fed on and inagnified growth on their doorstep would suffer much more.
e economic collapse. But all this occurred before the introducAgain, however, one cannot draw such a simple conclun of the currency board. The collapse of the Hong Kong dolsion. It is noteworthy that up to 1974, with a currency fixed to was the occasion for insisting that confidence could not be sterling, Hong Kong developed dramatically, particularly in ;tored until the currency was once again fixed! Certalnly the manufacturing and various services. Maoist China, however, nouncement, preceded by informal rumor. that the Hong went through the paroxvsms, absurdities, and cruelties of the *ng dollar was to be fixed stemmed the flight of capital. \W\e Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward, Famine was w' then a great reflux of capital back into Hong Kong. Goods common, and income per capita fell precipitously. Such negative loded back into the stores as panic-buying ceased. The recovshocks would be expected to have large effects on confidence y seemed miraculous -and it was dubbed by the Economist and economic conditions in Hong Kong. Yet in spite of periodia unalloyed success." cally closed borders and the influx of droves of penniless, dis-A number of shocks that would be expected to have a seriease-ridden, starving refugees, Hong Kong, with its currency .s effect on Hong Kong's finances -such as the BCCI failure allied to the dubious sterling, continued as one of the highest d fraud, the stock market crash of 1987, Tiananmen Square in growth countries in the world. Of course, it might have done ne 1989, the Gulf War of 1990, and the collapse of the better without a currency-board svstem -but that was tried tropean exchange-rate mechanism in 1992 and 1993 -from 1975-83 and found wanting. Amed to be dealt with relatively painlessly. Perhaps the biggest ock was the -tequila crisis" in 1994. But the effect on Hong SPECIAL REASONS wng was very short-lived. The effect on the exchange rate was FOR HONG KONG'S SUCCESS iall and limited to the first few days of l995. True, there was a Hong Kong, as everyone says, is different. 'With its free trade and )wdown in activity' levels and some increase in unemployliberal regime, it is perhaps the most flexible economy in the nt, but this had little to do with the Mexican crisis. The cause world -rivaled only by Singapore and perhaps New Zealand. is almost entirely due to the monetary squeeze being imposed It has enormous reserves (around $57 billion at the end of 1995) the PRC.
-about five times the note issue and near 40 percent of Hong Kong's M3 (a broad measure of the size of the financial system).
HE PRC EFFECT
Comparable levels are 6 percent in Germany and 2 percent in ie susceptibility of Hong Kong to gyrations in the PRC is obvithe United States and Japan. .s. One might think that the switches in policy' in the PRC One might argue that the solidity of the Hong Kong dollar )uld be the main cause of instabihty in Hong Kong. Yet the eviis underpinned by reserves that are far beyond the means of any nce does not support such a view In fact, exactly the opposite 'normal" country, such as Argentina or Colombia. And much of ay be true. The great liberalization of the PRC, ordained in the reserves is a consequence of persistent budgetary surpluses )78, began in 1979 and continued apace to 1983. This period (with notably low public spending) of around 2 percent of GDP incided with the greatest volatility in virtually all indices in during the period 1987-1994. The non-politicization of eco-
; A I N A nomic policy, which enabled these results to be achieved, is not maintain the status quo. possible with non-colonial governmental systems where the cenFour years ago, on a visit to China, I argued to the Peopl tral bank is controlled by politicians anxious to pay for the vote.
Bank (the PRCs central bank) that, politics aside, the best mo Are the reserves overdone? In my view they are, and this etary policy for China would be to fix the renminbi to the U was a serious matter when the reserves were held in sterling baldollar. But, of course, politics is never merely an aside in t ances in London or in T-bills in New York. The returns were very PRC. Nevertheless, the remarkable stability of the Chinese ci low and it was a waste of capital. Recently Hong Kong has been rency in terms of U.S. dollars over the last two or three yearsplacing the funds under professional management, so the opporcombined with the accumulation of very large reserves -su tunity costs of holding such reserves will be considerably gests that there is a similar belief among China's policy-maker reduced.
The transfer of power in 1997 could give a politica acceptable excuse for "unifying" the renminbi and the Ho: THE FUTURE Kong dollar. The renminbi has been trading at around 8.2 to S The PRC takes control of Hong Kong in 1997, but it has agreed to the U.S. dollar, and many forecasters believe that it will appi that for the next 50 years Hong Kong should have its own monciate in the years ahead. There seems to be an opening for t etary (and legal) system. This seems to mean that the currency PRC to unify the monetary systems. Instead of one nation, tx link will continue after the PRC gains sovereignty. In the absence systems -at least for monetary matters -there would be o of any serious outbreak of hostilities, I suspect this agreement system for all of China. will be honored by the PRC; it is greatly in their interests to a R t; E N I I F a.
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V. ARGENTINAS EXPERIENCE AFTER THE MEXICAN CRISIS BY GUILLERNMO CALVO Y NOW WE HAVE COVERED ALL OF THE MAIN ISSUES INVOLVED IN THIS DISCUSSION.
What I think would be useful is to discuss in greater detail the experiences of Argentina and Mexico. First, I want to point out that it is not obvious that Argentina, because of having a currency board, suffered more from the shocks emanating from the so-called tequila effect than it would have with a flexible exchange rate. However, ie case of Argentina cannot be fully explained by a purely Keynesian-type shock, so to help Kplain it I will introduce elements related to the financial sector. Second, I will go over some of ie issues that have already been raised, but perhaps with a different twist and with a greater mphasis on Argentina.
I am coming to this question, not from a theoretical point of view, or from the theory of optiium currency areas. I just want to understand what would have been the advantages for .rgentina of not having had a currency board.
The first thing I will do is to take Argentina and Mexico be translated into a fall in the amount of tradables consumed. d compare them using a very simple Keynesian model. If we For example, suppose that the supply of tradables is exogenous, Dk at the numbers, you can see that after the December 1994 then you have to contract the demand for tradables. If in the valuation of the Mexican peso, Mexico's current account short run tradable and nontradable goods are complementary ficit shrank by about 8 percent of GDP and output fell by and are consumed in fixed proportions (just for the sake of arguore than 7 percent. Argentina's current account deficit shrank ment), then the demand for both types of goods must fall by the about 2.5 percent and output fell by 4.4 percent. Those numsame proportion. If we assume that the sale of nontradables is 50 rs are in the same ballpark. Can we rationalize them? Well, a percent of output to begin with, then you can very easily con-,ynesian attempt at rationalization would be that here you clude (it is just a simple calculation) that if the output of nontve a shock affecting the capital account. The capital account tradables iS demand-determined, the supply of nontradables will ts to fall by this much: it was an exogenous shock that had to fall by the same proportion as the fall in the current account
deficit. If this theorem were fully validated in practice, I should sequence of a surge in bankruptcies, perhaps related to t find that the shrinkage in the current account is equal to the fall financial consequences discussed above, and for other reasoi in output. Of course, I don't expect to get the same numbers, but However, the basic thing you can say about devaluation is thai it seems that the numbers are large declines for Mexico, and they may speed up real exchange-rate realignment. That is somethi are relatively small declines for Argentina.
that a country subject to a currency board, as Argentina is nc The bottom line is that in a first approximation the shock does not have. It is not obvious to me that a devaluation foi that these countries suffered after the tequila effect was to a large country like that will be expansionary On the contrary, becat extent independent of the exchange rate -it would have been of this it could be a financial disaster. But one has to admit tl difficult to avoid it. The way to avoid it would have been for the if you think that there is a misalignment of the real exchan structure of demand to change very sharply in the short run, and rate, devaluation appears to be simpler than letting the pri you have to be prepared to make that assumption. I believe that level go down. there are such instances (for example, when the current account What are the policies or issues that have come up regai deficit is financed by foreign direct investment) when there is liting real exchange rate misalignment? As Alan and Max ha tle relation between domestic consumption and the service reminded us, vrage flexibility becomes central all of a sudd& (nontradable) sector. In these situations you can cut domestic You need wage flexibility, and as Max admitted, very few of consumption without affecting the demand for nontradables.
know how to make it effective and to make it function quicT But for countries like Argentina and Mexico, where the current enough to be a substitute for devaluation. I suppose that we ha account deficit was associated with consumption booms, then a lot to learn from this. As a mental note, Marty Weitzman f the reduction in aggregate demand had to have a negative effect an interesting book -The Share Economy -that deals with t on both, since I would expect that tradables and nontradables issue of flexibility Flexibility is unlikely to be sufficient; I thi tend to be more complementary on the consumption side. This you need flexibility and coordination. And that is the issue tt reasoning indicates that you cannot rule out the hypothesis that Marty deals with in The Share Economy.'n Argentina would have suffered a substantial fall in output even if
In the case of Argentina, where the tax on labor is abc it had devalued or had a different exchange rate system. 50 percent of the wage paid by the firm, one possible way What can you buy from devaluation? This is an aspect we coordinating, if you believe that you have a misalignment, is have discussed with respect to Mexico, but there are financial lower the tax on labor, which must be offset by a higher incor aspects that one tends to forget when we focus exclusively on the tax. In general, this restructuring of the composition of tax rc effect on the real exchange rate. Let me mention some straightenues does not make a difference in principle. But if wages ha forward points. If there is no explicit or implicit currency to fall, what you are doing is coordinating the fall in wages denomination mismatch, then the devaluation improves banks' cutting the wage paid by the firm and financing that by chargi balance sheets. That is an advantage of devaluation. It can the cost of this to the worker. So the worker ends up receivi improve balance sheets if you have an external shock and a cerless, and the firm ends up paying less. That is exactly what y. tain loss becomes non-performing, so devaluation can (in a way) would get in relative terms after a devaluation. The politii liquidate the debt. It also helps to stimulate the demand for problem, of course, is that it is a non-starter because it is deposits, and it prevents a run on banks. You saw it very clearly transparent. There is some discussion in Argentina about th in the case of Mexico, where the nominal level of deposits did and we are going to see whether that is possible or not. not fall. In contrast, in Argentina, where a devaluation did not Given the few options available, there is another approa occur, deposits fell by about 18 percent. So, there is a very difthat has been mentioned (and I am responsible for bringing it ferent experience between the two countries in this regard.
frequently in discussions -and it is not something I like): If t However, if bank liabilities are dollarized, as they were in other alternatives fail, then you can always resort to a temporc Argentina, then a devaluation that affects the real exchange rate real devaluation through a uniform tariff on imports that goes may have a negative effect on the health of the financial system. finance a uniform subsidy on exports. That will give you t When the liabilities are in dollars. even if assets are in dollars, at same advantages of a nominal devaluation. Of course, admin the moment of truth the assets are loans to the domestic econotratively it is very complicated. Nevertheless, there are seve my and are affected by the real exchange rate. So, if you were to advantages: devalue, the value of those assets would be likely to deteriorate. First, it has a limit. You cannot raise tariffs in real terms Devaluations affect the real economy as well. Output may more than 30 percent, because beyond that nobody pays a t fall, which has been the experience in Latin America as docuthere is tax evasion. So, there is some discipline to it; it is r mented by Sebastian Edwards and others. 9 It may fall as the conlike a nominal devaluation, xvhere you devalue 30 percent ai possibly explain a great deal of the falling out. Second -and I do not think this advantage has been suf-I will end with a discussion of how to avoid the credit ciently emphasized -you do not touch the financial system. squeeze. The first policy alternative is the one implemented by you are concerned about the effect that a devaluation can have Argentina, which is a tricky one -lowering the banks' reserve n a country like Argentina by affecting the viability of bank requirements during the run. If depositors believe you and stop )ans, this approach does not touch the system at all. So, in prnrunning, then you are fine, because you are able to keep the level iple, loans are more likely to continue to be paid.
of loans relatively constant. The disadvantage of this temporary devaluation is very Nly conclusion from the previous analysis is that that was imiliar: You put this in place, but nobody believes it, and for it not enough because there was a composition effect. That is be effective the adjustment has to be credibly temporary: More where the current account deficit must be taken into account, ian likely, it is not going to be credible, and if it is not credible, even when dealing with what is the ideal optimal level for bank sen there is not going to be adjustment. Therefore, at the end reserve ratios. In any case, for Argentina the reserve ratio prior f the road, you may find yourself with the same problems still to the crisis xvas 20 percent, which was not enough. In this type sere in spite of the imposition of trade taxes and subsidies. But of situation, you may wuant to have enough reserves not only to ou do have some breathing space. I mention this as the last stimulate but also to expand the level of loans, assuming that big ,sort, not the first -as something you could do if the only firms are going to come in and crowd out small and medium Iternative wvere a nominal devaluation.
firms. Finally, let me say something about the credit squeeze in Another point concerns the linkages between domestic .rgentina. You hear a lot about that, partly as a result of the fall and international banks -the idea that it would provide autoi the demand for deposits. which dropped by ahout 18 percent matic liquidity In this case it did not work properly Connected i the first half of 1995. Argentina cushioned that by lowering with this fact is that large state-owned banks may make the presie banks' reserve requirements. So when you look at loans to ence of international banks problematic. Argentina. I underie private sector, they hardly budged -maybe a 3 percent fall. stand, has free entry for banks; anyone who has a reputation as lowever, everybody talks about the credit effect. I propose the a banker can have a subsidiary in Argentina. However, we have sllowing explanation for why you could have gotten a big crednot seen a wave of banks coming into that market, even though effect from the current account shrinkage. The cut in the curArgentina reputedlv has one of the most inefficient banking sys-:nt account deficit could have had strong effects on the domestems in Lattn America, and so in theory there must be a lot of c credit market if local borrowers do not have access to interroom for making prolit. A possible interpretation is that when ational capital markets and depend very heavily on domestic you have very large public banks, as is the case there, and those anks. For the sake of argument, lets assume that the current banks are always going to be protected by the fiscal authority, ccount deficit was going to finance new Ioans to prime bordirectly or through international official loans, banks may find awers. The deficit was ctiL by 2.5 percent of GDP Suppose those that competition is too difficult and makes entry into the market ,rime borrowmers turn around and find funding for this 2.5 pertoo risky. ent. Loans to the private sector in Argentina correspond to To summarize, I think that there are likely' to be shocks out bout 10 percent of GDP, and the 2.5 percent cut in internationthere that have similar effects on both flexible and fixed I credit implies that demand for domestically financed loans exchange rate systems. If the economy is dollarized, devaluation ase by 25 percent of the total supply of domestic credit. That is is especially risky A currency board will always face the problem large amount. So even though the total is fixed (this is only an of realigning the real exchange rate. The solutions available have xample; unfortunately' we do not have the numbers, which supnot been sufficiently tried or they are not very transparent, like ,osedly are now being collected), there could have been a very the real devaluation via trade interventions that I mentioned. But irge change in composition in favor of prime borrowers and I believe that in some countries, and Argentina is an example, gainst small-and medium-sized firms -those not haNing the existence of' a straitjacket like this is focusing the politicians' ccess to international markets. attention on perfecting the labor market as they never have That is the bad news. The good news is Lhat a small recovbefore. There is so much room to conquer there -and there is rv in the current account deficit can turn things around very so much room for improvement -that in the end the process uickly You don't need a large current account deficit to have a may be painful, but iL mavy help push basic and fundamental ,ig effect on the domestic credit market. So my boLtom line in structural adjustment his respect for the case of Argentina is that if you put together There is an xcellent publication that you all should look at on precisely this topic; it narrates the discusions of a conference held in January 1992, sponsored by the Latin American Region of the Vorld Bank, which featured, among others, Guillermo Calvo and Alan Walters. ' Let me begin with the general considerations. There is no exchange-rate system that works zest in all circumstances. Whatever exchange-rate system you have, you will at some point wish ou had a different system. That is to say that whatever we are talking about, we are not going D design a system that operates best in the face of all different shocks.
The currency board is a commitment to a fixed exchange Incidentally, it is an interesting fact that the small-large te, and we have a standard analysis of when it is optimal lo fix country consideration cannot be right; we very rarely recomie exchange rate in a very simple generalization of the Poole mend multiple currencies for a single country If the size of the nalysis: Fixing the exchange rate works best in response to economy is one of the key issues, we would be a lot more interioney-demand shocks. But that analysis assumes away capital ested in recommending multiple exchange rates within coun--count shocks. Looking a little further, we have the optimal tries. Why don't we? Probably because of the labor market flexurrency area analysis of when it is optimal to fix the exchange ibility that is assumed, because of capital market flexibility that ite, and it says that when there is factor mobility -that means is assumed, and perhaps because of the assumption of fiscal poloth labor and capital, and includes the assumption of goodsicy flexibility Underlying all of these analyses, by the way, is iarket flexibilityit is probably optimal to have a fixed some sort of wage and price inflexibility That is the basic startKchange rate.
ing point. If you wvere to conclude, based on your assessments 1"
regarding factor market flexibility, that at the best of times you macroeconomic shocks. do not want a fixed exchange rate for your country, you would There is another strand that I have not quite integrate not go into a currency board except to put constraints on the into my thinking but that I would like to put on the tabl central bank.
Domingo Cavallo has spoken about the benefits of a currenc A currency board is far more than a fixed exchange rate. It board. He says there is one thing that a currency board mak also constrains the central bank in two ways -two features that clear: It makes clear the fiscal consequences of monetary polic were emphasized by John Williamson. The first is that it conWhen you do not have the right to create liquidity, you real strains monetary policies to operate according to gold principle understand what the central bank is doing when it engages i standards, which says that in response to a deficit in the balance those activities. We somehow think that the central bank is cr of payments, you should contract the money supply, and a ating money that has no consequences -at least that is my na deficit could arise from either the current account or the capital ural mode of thinking. Actually, there is a transfer involved fro] account. So it says that in response to all such shocks (and somebody to somebody Domingos argument, which I think li maybe they are the shocks that you should respond to), let the considerable validity, is that a currency board makes you unde money supply adjust. The second constraint is that a currency stand what the transfer is. So when you ask what the costs are board also precludes the operation of the central bank as a loosing the lender of last resort, you may want to ask how ofte lender of last resort, at least in the pure form of the currency are there shifts in the demand for the monetary base that yc board.
should stop -for example, those resulting from bank runs arn Now, these are a lot of constraints to impose on monetary ing out of a clear blue sky, rather than induced by inappropria policy I do not think that if you had a central bank you knew bank behavior. Those of us brought up on the stories of tC would act optimally in all circumstances, you would go for a Great Depression think that that is what happens most often. I currency board, but it is precisely because you know that that we look at banking problems in a lot of countries during the pa does not always happen, that you impose those constraints. That few years, we may not agree with what the central banks shoul is why we have had the emphasis from John and Max that you be doing most of the time. It may well be that you want to loc typically do it after a period of very high inflation, when the at what is being done and think about the transfers of resourc credibility of monetary policy has been destroyed, and you need that are being made. to put very tight constraints on what is going to be done.
I still have not integrated my thinking fully on this issu Those constraints on monetary policy may be very expenand I am still conscious of the fact that the Internation sive, and I am going to come to the Argentine case in a while, Monetary Funds Exchange Affairs Department requires the! but first I want to mention a very interesting question about the subsidies to be registered in the fiscal accounts. When yc lender-of-last-resort function. Until a week ago I was pretty sure recapitalize the banks via the central bank, the Fund says: Pi that imposing constraints on that role was quite ambiguous, but that into the budget, and preferably keep the central bank who then I listened to the governor of the Estonian Central Bank, and in its balance sheet, and recognize that there is a fiscal resour he said something we need to reflect on. He said that having a involved. I think that this practice is probably right, but I thin currency board was very useful in dealing with banking probonce you start thinking that way, you wonder whether th lems. Why did he say that? Because he could not bail out banks lender-of-last-resort function is worthwhile. Yet in our traditiot that should not be bailed out. The conclusion I draw in the al way of thinking about it, the role of lender of last resort com shocks analysis is that not having the lender-of-last-resort funcvery naturally when thinking about bank runs; it is actual tion is a real loss if you are dealing with macroeconomic shocks straightforward and something that ought to be part of the ro that come from outside the system. But if you are dealing with a of the central bank. shock that comes from inside the banking system as a result of Now, the question is: Can you have it both ways? Can yc poor bank management and supervision, it is probably a gain have the currency board with its credible commitment to a fixe not to have a lender of last resort. We will have to think a little exchange rate and have the flexibility that you want on bankir more once we are in the world of the second best, wvhere a cenpolicy and on monetary policy? The answer is yes; by buildir tral bank does not always do what it should be doing according up excess reserves or by getting access to credit, you can have to an unconstrained optimum. The question of whether losing both ways. If the central bank has the ability to increase i the lender-of-last-resort function is unambiguously a bad thing reserves through loans, or if the central bank has built up a po, has to be reconsidered in a second-best world where a central of excess reserves, then it can do all these things as well. So yc bank faces pressures to bail out banks inappropriately and are not totally lost in the things we now call currency boards where the banks' troubles in the first place were not the result of you wvant to preserve some flexibility but then you better recol
.e that you are not operating under the theory of the gold stanmission of financial crises is much greater than it was four years -d or under the theory of the pure currency board, but you ago. I do not doubt that in the Mexican situation the authorities *'e designed yourself an intermediate system that is halfway were able to keep the banking system afloat -via a range of ween discretionary monetary policy and the automatic polimeasures that we hold our noses at but secretly admire -and s that we conventionally analyze when we are looking at the did not have masses of banks close down, which was actually an oration of currency boards.
important element contributing to the fact that an 8 percent Let me make my last general remark about the question of adjustment in the external sector was accompanied by less than ce flexibility and labor market flexibility before I go to a numan 8 percent decline in GDP Of course, a large part of that came -of specific cases. A lot of what concerns us and a lot of where from the switching that resulted from the change in the real leverage of monetary policy comes from is from wage and exchange rate, but I think some of it also came out of the freece inflexibility The question is: Just how ingrained is that? Is dom that Mexico had for safeguarding the banking system. omething that might change over time? How important is the Second, we have also had more currency-board experility to adjust the money supply or the exchange rate? I fear ences since 1992 -namely Estonia and Lithuania. Both have It you have all heard me quote one of Bob Mundell's best lines, withstood very large banking crises, and the exchange rate has ich is that everybody thinks that what Adam and Eve discovheld. And as I mentioned earlier, at least the Estonians believe d in the Garden of Eden was the secret of sex, but he says that the constraint helped in that case, although it does not help in [t is not what they really discovered. They discovered the the case where the shock is external. So that is an interesting new :ret of central banking -mainly that by writing down a few experience. We have an enormous concern about the lender-ofmbers on a piece of paper, you could move the entire real last-resort function, and I want to come back to the question of inomy It is quite likely that if we were to loose that knowlhow you build up some flexibility If you now assume that you we would move toward a system in which wages and have a reasonably well behaved central bank, as the central bank ces became more flexible. Now, it will take a long time for this of Argentina has now become, can you give it more flexibility? happen, but it's something that could eventually develop.
Well, you have the Hong Kong solution: If you acquire sufficient Let me now turn from those general considerations to reserves to the point of being five times the money base, then ;wer the question I posed at the beginning: What have we you are basically free to conduct monetary policy as you please, rned in the last four years? and the constraint is not binding while the exchange rate con-I think that the first important lesson is that banking sysstraint is totally credible. That would be very nice if you could as and financial systems are extremely important, wvhich was do it. It is not going to help Argentina right now because it is not dent in Guillermo Calvo's statement. We now understand betgoing to be able to generate that sort of current account surthat where the currency-board constraint really bites is in the pluses in the short run. ,ssure it puts on the banks. I must say that I thought Third, we have the emerging Argentine experience with illermo's claim regarding the proportional equivalence pre-established lines of credit. Doing that with the private sector ween the extent of external and internal adjustment in is very interesting; we will have to see how strong those lines are *xico and Argentina was a little much. I did the numbers for in the face of a serious international crisis. But given that the Mexican and Argentine crises; the response in Argentina, relamounts are not massive, they probably are very strong. So you cely to the domestic contraction given the external adjustment can get access to foreign lines of credit as a way of giving yourMexico, was twice the size of the one experienced by Mexico.
self a lender of last resort. There is another possibility that we in at is pretty large even within the rounding area for econothe Fund have been asked about very often: Can we create a sts. So I think that the emphasis on the pressure exerted on lender-of-last-resort function for countries in trouble? Well, I say banking system in a circumstance like that is indeed importhat is just what we are. When you get into trouble, as you did Lt. It leads you in the direction of thinking about how we get in 1995, we lend to you, and you can use resources for the bank-)re international banks into the domestic market. Can we ing system or whatever. They say that they needed assistance prove the quality of our banking systems? Can we make them earlier, that in the future they will need lines of credit that are s vulnerable to shocks of that sort? Well, to be invulnerable to unconditional. Well, I don't think that the Fund would be in that jcks of the magnitude of the tequila effect on Argentina via the position, but there is in the international system some ability for aking system, you have to build a lot of excess capacity into banks that get into severe trouble when private credit dries up to it system and almost certainly impair its efficiency as a finanat least offset some of it. I intermediary. So the emphasis on banking systems and the
The fourth new experience that we have had since early )rld Bank's understanding of the role they play in the trans-1992 is the debate over European Monetary Union (EMU),
which has sharpened our understanding of how to operate in a pressures that move, on the whole, in a healthy direction. presumably irreversible fixed exchange rate system. This is one So, those are a few considerations that perhaps tell important element of the currency board, and the analysis of something different now from what we would have said f( what it takes to operate in that environment has emphasized all years ago. Where do they move you? They move you to s the things that Max has been talking about -fiscal flexibility, Banking systems aside. I am more favorably inclined tow. labor market flexibility, capital market flexibility I think there is fixed exchange rate systems than I used to be. There is a cost a heightened awareness in the profession, and certainly among giving up the flexibility of the exchange rate. There is no qu policy-makers, of what it takes, and there is an emerging view tion about that, but it is so frequently misused that it is that provided that you make progress in those areas, it may be entirely clear how large the cost is on average. But if you m quite helpful for large countries -not only for economic reathat way, the emphasis should be on getting your banking s sons in the case of EMU -to operate with a single currency tem in shape and doing all those things to make markets w Achieving progress in these areas requires a lot in the direction better, which you need to do in any case. For how many cot of legislation as well as labor market institutions like unions. But tries would you recommend currency boards as opposed t I don't think -and this is the part I find interesting -that any potentially fixed exchange rate with a domestic currency? In rigidities that are going to be removed in order to make the EMU end, I think that you would come back to the small counti look better are inflexibilities that we do not think should be but with a bit less certainty than four years ago. removed. The pressures that the EMU puts on the system are I LI l T 
